



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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CPAS/CIG

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Saturday  
20 August 1983*

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
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**ISRAEL-LEBANON: Preparing To Redeploy**

*Israeli forces have dismantled their support facilities in the areas south and east of Beirut and soon will be able to withdraw rapidly their troops and remaining equipment to improved positions south of the Awwali River.* [redacted]

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[redacted] the US defense attache in Beirut reports that the Ad Damur depot, the last of three Israeli support facilities north of the Awwali River, was dismantled this week. It was the primary support facility for Israeli forces in the Beirut area. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Redeployment preparations to date lend support to stated Israeli Government intentions to conduct a swift withdrawal of troops to southern Lebanon. Once the political decision to begin the pullback is made, the Israelis probably will need two to three days to complete it. Although new facilities along the Awwali River will not be ready until next month at the earliest, the Israelis probably will decide to move before construction is complete. [redacted]

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The new line of Israeli forward positions will encompass the 40- to 45-kilometer security zone that was the basic objective of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The withdrawal almost certainly will be accomplished by late September, when the weather becomes worse.

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A rapid redeployment of Israeli forces will leave a power vacuum in the Shuf and Alayh regions. As a result, intensified fighting between Druze and Lebanese Forces militiamen may thwart the Lebanese Army's efforts to establish control. [redacted]

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**NICARAGUA: Insurgent Advances**

*Anti-Sandinista insurgents are moving deeper into Nicaragua, while sporadic incidents continue on the Honduran border.*

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Defense Minister Ortega has publicly acknowledged the increased guerrilla activity in central Nicaragua, saying the insurgents are better organized and supplied than they were during heavy fighting around Jalapa earlier this year. Last week the guerrillas damaged a bridge near the military base of Apanas, and repairs reportedly will take a month to complete.

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**Comment:** The apparent return of the insurgents in force to the rugged mountainous area around Jinotega and Matagalpa suggests they have strengthened their logistic support. They had to withdraw from the area earlier this year when they could not support their operations.

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
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**PAKISTAN: Crackdown on Opposition**

*President Zia's military government is moving forcefully to prevent the spread of disturbances in Sind Province that were provoked by the opposition coalition.* [ ]

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The Army moved into several cities in Sind on Thursday after rioting remained widespread for the fifth day. The US Consul General in Karachi reports that so far at least 11 persons, including several policemen, have died and that hundreds have been arrested. [ ]

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The rioters have singled out government property for attack, including courts, railways, and road transport, and they have threatened candidates running in the local elections scheduled to be held in September. To try to curb the violence, authorities have ordered stiff fines, floggings, and long jail terms for rioters. [ ]

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Other parts of Pakistan so far have remained quiet, although the press reports that crowds gathered in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, and Quetta on Thursday to watch opposition leaders offer themselves for arrest. A strike has been called in Punjab Province for next Wednesday, and the main Sunni religious party reportedly is considering joining the protest movement this weekend. [ ]

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**Comment:** Zia is facing the most serious opposition to his six-year regime. His rule is not immediately endangered, and he and the military leaders apparently are confident that the Army will halt the violence. If the main Sunni party enters the protest movement, however, the opposition movement could gain more momentum in Karachi, and the demonstrations would be more likely to spread to the key province of Punjab. [ ]

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Apart from the Army, Zia lacks a committed domestic constituency and has used external threats and a prosperous economy to maintain public order. Zia has some support in Punjab, but diverse opponents there could coalesce against him if they believe he is vulnerable. [ ]

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The Army will support Zia as long as the violence remains confined to Sind. It could not be counted on, however, if it is called on to suppress widespread disturbances in Punjab, which is the home of a large majority of the military. [ ]

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### **IRAQ-IRAN: Possible Spread of War**

*Iraq, coping with an increasingly desperate economic situation, is more seriously considering attacks on oil tankers serving Iran.* [redacted]

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The US Embassies in Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia report Baghdad recently has indicated to the governments of those countries that it may soon attack Iranian oil targets in the Persian Gulf, raising Gulf states' fears of Iranian retaliation against them. The Kuwaitis were told that decision depends on whether Baghdad receives additional financial aid from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. A Saudi official recently told the US Ambassador that Riyadh will urge the Gulf Cooperation Council at its meeting next week to discuss the implications of Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil targets. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Iraq has been reluctant to broaden the war, but it will be more willing to do so as other actions fail to alleviate its severe financial difficulties. Iraq will incur a current account deficit this year totaling an estimated \$15 billion. The additional aid the Arab states may provide in response to the Iraqi threats probably will not be enough to meet Baghdad's needs. [redacted]

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With Tehran certain to continue preventing oil exports from Iraq's Persian Gulf terminals, Baghdad's only hope of increasing its oil revenues substantially is a decision by Syria to reopen the pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Damascus, however, has so far ignored Saudi and even Soviet requests that the pipeline be reopened. Iraqi leaders thus are likely to conclude that they have no choice but to attack oil tankers. [redacted]

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**EC-GREECE: Reactions to Papandreou's INF Proposal**

EC governments are rejecting Greece's call for a six-month delay in INF deployment. British, Italian, and Belgian officials have told US counterparts their governments will rebuff Prime Minister Papandreou's suggestion that the EC Foreign Ministers consider the proposal during their informal talks in Athens on 12 September. West Germany and Denmark are calling the idea unacceptable in letters to the Greek Foreign Ministry. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Most West European governments are irritated at Greece's unilateral initiatives. They also oppose discussing security issues in EC forums. To limit the impact of Papandreou's proposal, however, some EC governments may avoid responding publicly.

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